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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
JAMES R. HENRY,
Appellant,

Case No.

-vs.-

9249

WASHIKI CLUB, INCORPORATED,
Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

THE FACTS
In this brief we refer to the parties as they appeared
in the court below.
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brief
is not complete and omits certain salient facts which were
relied upon by the court in arriving at its decision in
defendant's favor. We, therefore, deem it necessary to
supplement the Statement of Facts in appellant's brief
with the following:
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Defendant operates a night club or tavern in the
basement of the Ogden Hotel in Ogden. (McKinley deposition, p. 4.) The club consists essentially of a bar, an
orchestra stand, and a dance floor and table and chairs
for patrons. The 1nain room is approximately 40 feet by
90 feet in dimensions. (l\icKinley deposition, p. 5.) Rest
rooms for both male and female patrons are situated at
one end, being the same end as that where the bar is
located. (McKinley deposition, pp. 5-6) The tables and
chairs provided for the accommodation of patrons are
generally in the opposite end of the room. (Plaintiff's
deposition, p·p. 28-30.) Because of a lo'v ceiling over the
bar, the neon light identifying the men's rest room is not
visible from most of the area occupied by the tables and
chairs. (McKinley deposition, pp. 6-9.)
At the opposite end of the room from the rest rooms
are two swinging doors. Over the s"inging doors is a
neon sign which says "Dining Room.'' This sign, however, was not illuminated on the evening of the accident
and was not observed by plaintiff. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. 33.) At that time there "\Yas no other sign of any
kind on or over the doors. ( I\Icl~inley deposition, p. 7.)
Through the swinging doors "\Yas an old kitchen roon1,
which at the time of the accident "\Yas used by defendant
for storage of beer, ice, and other supplies. (McKinley
deposition, p. 6.) .A.ccording to plaintiff's testimony
there was no light "rhatsoever in this roon1. (Plaintiff's
deposition, p. 63.) However, according to the testilnony
of Mcl\inley it \Yas lighted by a :25 "\Yatt globe for the
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convenience of defendant's employees. ( l\IcKinley deposition, pp. 7-8.) In a corner of the storage room, diagonally opposite to the SV\ inging doors, were t\vo doors, one
leading to a sump pump in the basement. (McKinley
deposition, p. 9.)
7

As indicated in plaintiff's brief, on the evening of
the accident plaintiff had gone on a party with a group
of friends during which they had been drinking, eating
and dancing. Although plaintiff attempted to minimize
the drinking on his deposition, he admitted, when pressed,
that he had had at least five and possibly as many as
seven whiskey high balls during the course of the evening
prior to the occurrence of the accident. (Plaintiff's deposition, p. · 58.) According to the testimony of Phipps,
about one-half of the contents of plaintiff's pint of Jim
Beam had been consumed when he found the bottle the
next day. (Phipps' deposition, p. 36.) This would indicate that plaintiff drank a half pint of whisky before the
party returned the Combo, plus whatever he drank thereafter at the 'Combo and the Washiki ·Club. (From three
to five more drinks.)
Although plaintiff had been in defendant's place of
business on only one prior occasion and did not know
of the location of the n1en's rest room, he did not make
any inquiry of defendant's employees as to its location,
but instead, undertook to locate it by his own search.
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 33.) Although there was nothing on or over the swinging doors to indicate or suggest
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that they led to a rest room, plaintiff passed through
them and into the kitchen or storage room. (Plaintiff'5
deposition, p. 33.) He testified that it was very dark,
and there was no light, that he could barely see at all,
and that he more or less felt or groped his way through
the room or passageway until he made a turn. (Plaintiff's deposition, pp. 33-35.) He then, in some unexplained fashion, fell down a stairway. Although plaintiff had a cigarette lighter ·with him he did not avail
himself of any light which it might afford. (Plaintiff's
deposition, p. 34.)
In plaintiff's argu1nent he states that defendant
should have been aware of the danger of patrons passing
into the kitchen or storage room and falling do'vn the
stairway because there had been previous similar episodes. However, the record does not so indicate. Although McKinley and defendant's employees, Kixon and
Lemmon, admitted that on prior occasions a few patrons
had gone as far as the s'vinging doors, they all testified
that none had ever passed 1nore than a step or t\YO beyond them. Other patrons had pro1nptly and properly
recognized that the doors did not lead to rest rooms or
any other facilities \vhich defendant's patrons """ere invited to use. (Nixon deposition, pp. 10, 11, 12; Lem1non
deposition, p. 5; l\Icl{inley deposition, pp. 8-9, 15.) They,
therefore, returned in11nediately to the main portion of
the pren1ises and made inquir~~ of defendant's employees,
rather than seeking the rest roon1 at a place \Yhere it
quite obviously could not be l'xpected to be. (Nixon
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deposition, pp. 10, 11, 12; Lemmon deposition, p. 5; McKinley deposition, p. 15.) The only person other than
plaintiff ever shown to have gone beyond the swinging
doors was one Carl L. Gillies. However, his experience
occurred on the same night as plaintiff's. (R. 16, McKinley deposition, p. 15.) And he had the prudence to
light a match, thus discovering the presence of the stairway and avoiding it. (R. 16, Nixon deposition, p. 12.)
McKinley had been 1nanager of the W ashiki Club six
years when his deposition was taken, (McKinley deposition, p. 3) and Nixon had been employed there four years,
(Nixon deposition, p. 2).
Since there were no signs indicating or suggesting the
presence of a rest room in or near the place where plaintiff's accident occurred, plaintiff was not as to that p·ortion of the premises an invitee, and defendant had no
duty of care toward him. In the absence of any evidence
that any other patron had, on any previous occasion,
passed beyond the swinging doors or into any hazards
which may have lurked in the dimly lighted kitchen, defendant was under no duty to anticipate that a patron
such as the plaintiff here, would pass so far into the
room, without benefit of any light, as to fall down a sump
pump located in the far corner of the room. ~1oreover,
in undertaking to pass through a darkened room with
which he was wholly unfamiliar and without undertaking
to use such means of light as he had available, plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk barring any recovery on his part.
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POINTS TO BE ARGL"ED
POINT I
PLAIN'TIFF WAS AT BEST A LICENSEE AT THE
PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT O·CCURRED AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT OWED HIM NO DUTY TO MAKE
THE PREMISES SAFE, AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY
NEGLIGENCE OR BREACH OF DU'TY TOWARD HIM.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGEN·CE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK AS A MA'TTER OF
LAW.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE ULTIMATE FA·CTS,
AND THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT TO
BE DETERMINED BY A JURY. THEREFORE THIS IS A
PROPER CASE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ARGlT~IENT

POINT I
PLAIN'TIFF WAS AT BEST A LICENSEE AT THE
PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT O·CCURRED AND THEREFORE THE DEFENDANT OWED HIM NO DUTY TO MAKE
THE PREMISES SAFE, AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY
NEGLIGENCE OR BREACH OF DU'TY TOWARD HIM.
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vV e here answer plaintiff's Points I and III. It is
conceded that plaintiff entered upon defendant's premises as an invitee. Jiowever, it is well settled that a business invitee as to one portion of a land-owner's premises
Inay be but a 1nere licensee or even a trespasser as to
another portion of the premises. It is equally well settled
that the duty to exercise care for the safety of an invitee
extends only to that portion of the premises to which the
invitation extends. The general rule is well stated in 38
Am. Jur. 761, Negligence, Sec. 100, which reads as follows:
"An owner or occupant is liable for an injury
sustained by a person, vvho entered the premises
by invitation as a result of a defective condition
of the premises only where the part of the premises upon which the injury was sustained was
covered by the invitation. If a person, although
on the premises by invitation, goes to a place not
covered by the invitation, the owner's duty of care
owed to such a person as ··an invitee ceases forthwith. Thus, where one enters a part of the premises reserved for the use of the occupant and his
employees, and to which there was no express or
implied invitation to go, there can be no recovery
for resulting injury, even though he is an invitee
to other parts of the premises. This does not
mean that the duty of an owner to have his premises in such condition that an invitation to visit
him may be accepted \vithout danger of p·ersonal
injury from a defective condition is limited necessarily to any specific portion of the premises; but
it is limited to parts that reasonably appear to
have been designed, adapted and prepared for the
accommodation of such a person and to those
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parts to which the invitee reasonably may be
expected to go, in vie'v of the invitation given
him.''
See also A.L.I., Restatement of Torts, Sec. 343, Colnrnent b:
"Under the rule stated in this Section, a possessor of land is subject to liability to another
as a business visitor only for such bodily harm as
he sustains while upon a part of the land upon
which the possessor gives the other reason to believe that his presence is permitted or desired because of its connection with the business or affairs
of the possessor and \v·hich as such is held open
to the other as a business visitor."
See also Sec. 341, Comment b.
In Prosser on Torts, 2d Edition, page ±58, the author says:
"The special obligation to,vard invitees exists
only while the visitor is upon the part of the
premises "rhich the occupier has thrown open to
him for the purpose "~hich 1nakes him an invitee.
This 'area of invitation' "Till of course vary "ith
the circu1nstances of the case. * * * If the custoIner is invited or encouraged to go to an unusual
part of the pre1nises, such as behind a counter or
into a storeroo1n, for the purpose 'vhich has
brought hin1, he ren1ains an invitee; but 1J he
goes U'ithout such encouragcJJlcnt and solely on
hi~s own i11,itiati.ve, he is only a licensee if there is
consent, or a trespasser if there is not." (Elnphasis ours.)
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The rule has been recognized by this court and the
passage above quoted from Am. Jur. 'vas cited with approval in the case of Hayward vs. Downi·ng, (Utah), 189
Pac. 2d 442. This court also quoted with approval from
38 Am. J ur. 794, Negligence, Sec. 133 as follows:
"The duty of the proprietor of a place of
business which is open to public patronage to use
ordinary care to 1nake the p-remises safe for customers is generally limited to that part of the
premises designed, adapted and prepared for the
accommodation of customers, or to which customers mwy reasonably be expected to go.''
See also Thompson vs. Beard and G.abelman, Inc.,
(Kan.), 216 Pac. 2d 798, where the court said at p. 800:
"The duty of the proprietor of a place of
business which is open to p·ublic patronage to use
ordinary care to make the premises reasonably
safe for customers is generally limvted to that
part of the premises designed, adapted, and prepared for the accomn~odation of customers, or to
which customers may reasonably be expected to
go. The duty of the proprietor of a place of business to his customers does not require him to render safe for their use parts of the building reserved for use only by him and his employees,
such as p-rivate offices, shipping rooms, and warerooms, unless he expressly or impliedly invites
or induces a customer to enter such a reserved
part. (38 Am. tTur. 794, and cases cited.) A person who has received an injury in consequence of
passing through ~ 'vrong doorway in a part of the
building not designed for the use of unattended
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customers cannot recover unless he vvas induced
to enter therein by the invitation or allurement
of the proprietor. (38 Am. Jur. 796 and cases cited
innote15)." (Sic.)
See also Trautloff v. Danver
SW2d 866.

M~lls,

(1fo. App.), 316

Plaintiff has cited and relied upon the Kansas cases
of Campbell v. Weathers, 111 P 2d 72, and Bass vs. Hunt,
100 P 2d 696. However, both of those cases are readily
distinguishable from the case at bar. In each case a state
law required the operator of a restaurant to p·rovide
toilet facilities for the patrons. In each case the path·w,ay
provided for the patrons to the toilet was rendered
hazardous by the presence of an open trap door. In both
cases the path was dark and the hazard could not be
readily observed. There was no question in either case
as to the plaintiff following the proper and only course
leading to the toilet facilities, whereas in the case at bar,
there is no evidence of any danger whatsoever in the
route actually leading to the toilet facilities actually
provided by defendant. Here the plaintiff \Yas not following a path indicated to him by the proprietor, but on
the contrary \vas going in an entirely opposite direction
in the fruitless search for the facilities he sought. Attention is also invited to the n1ore recent Kansas case of
Thompson v. Beard and Gabeln11an, Inc., (l(an.), 216 P.
2d 798, \Yhere under facts analogous to those here, the
l{ansas ·Court follo\Yed the theor~~ for \Yhich "~e here
contend.
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We have heretofore cited portions of the comment to
Sec. 343 of the Restatement of Torts. Those portions of
the comrnent quoted in appellant's brief are wholly inapplicable here. Comment d pertains to what a business
visitor is entitled to expect on that portion of the prem·ises to which the invitation extends. The portion of comment b quoted by plaintiff pertains to a situation where
the possessor has '"intentionally or negligently mis-led"
the visitor into a reasonable belief that a particular
passageway or door is an appropriate means of reaching
the area which the visitor is invited to enter. There is
no evidence in this case that defendant, either intentionally or negligently, did anything which would mislead a
patron into believing that the swinging doors to the storeroom led to the men's rest room.
The case of lJfartin v. Jones, (Ut.), 253 P 2d 359,
cited and quoted by plaintiff, is not applicable to the instant case. In that case the plaintiff was admittedly
trespassing. However, his presence in a position of potential danger was observed by one of defendant's employees. Although she, (the employee), was aware of the
danger confronting plaintiff, she did not warn him of it.
The case was decided under the principle set forth under
Sec. 337 of the Restatement of Torts dealing with the
duty of a possessor of land to a trespasser where the
possessor knows or should know of the trespasser's p·resence ~n dangerous proximity to an artificial dangerous
condition and where the condition is of such a nature
that the possessor would have reason to believe that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trespasser would not discover it or realize the risk involved therein. There is no evidence in this case that any
employee of the defendant was aware that plaintiff had
passed through the S\vinging doors or that he had attempted or would attempt to pass through the darkness
of defendant's storeroom to the head of the stairs to the
sump pump.
As previously noted in our Statement of Facts, there
is no evidence that any patron of defendant had passed
beyond the swinging doors leading to defendant's storeroom prior to the accident here involved. The testimonies
of McKinley, Nixon and Lemmon were all to the effect
that whenever they observed anyone go through the
swinging doors, such persons immediately recognized
that such did not lead to the rest room and immediately
turned around and came back. The only other person
ever shown to have n1ade the same mistake as plaintiff
is Carl Gillies, -vvhose affidavit appears at Page 16 of
the record. By the terms of his own affidavit, his nlistake occurred on the same night as plaintiff's. In the
absence of any showing that other patrons had on prior
occasions passed through the S\vinging doors and through
the storage roon1 to the area of the stair\Yay leading
to the sump roon1, there is no basis upon \vhich a jury
could find that defendant should have kno\Yn of, or anticipated the presence of its patrons in that area.
rrhe cases ei tL'd and relied upon by plaintiff under
I)oint III of his brief are so different fro1n the facts of
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the case at bar as to be readily distinguishable. The case
of Ilectus v. Chicago Transi~t Company, (Ill. App.), 122
NE~d 587, arose out of a collision between one of defendant's buses with one of its patrons, who had disInounted from the bus. After dismounting, the plaintiff
used a rest room situated inside a loop in defendant's
track. The accident occurred as plaintiff 'vas crossing
the track to the outside of the loop after leaving the rest
room. One of the issues was whether plaintiff was an
invitee. Because there was substantial evidence that the
rest room had been used by the defendant's patrons and
others, the court held that it was jury question whether
plaintiff was an invitee.
The case of Palmer v. Boston Penny Savings Bank,
(Mass.), 17 NE2d 899, involved an erroneous choice of
two similar doors. In that case plaintiff attempted to
return to defendant's premises through the same door
he entered. Upon finding it locked, he made a fairly
careful attempt to find the correct door, before he finally
mistakenly passed through the wrong one. The facts,
as stated in the opinion of the Court, are as follows:
"The jury could find that the plaintiff with
two companions, returned to the garage about 2
o'clock in the morning, February 11, 1933, and
that, as they came along the middle of Waldo
Street, there were no lights upon this private way
or upon the outside of the garage. They tried to
open the center door but \Vere unable to do so.
They then inspected this door to determine if it
contained a smaller door through which a person
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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might pass. They did not find any such door.
They looked through the glass in the center door
and saw a dim light inside the garage. They rapped upon the door but none of the defendant's
employees heard them, although one was busy in
the stock room, a short distance away, checking
figures. They then looked to see if there was another entrance to the garage. One of the plaintiff's friends walked to the right and opened the
easterly door, and the plaintiff believing that
he was then using the westerly door, stepped inside and almost immediately fell down the iron
stairway.''
The court in that case recognized the principle upon
which defendant relies here:
"If the plaintiff was injured "\\rhile upon a
portion of the premises to which he was not induced to go by the defendant in the transaction
of the business between them, then, \vhile there,
he could not demand the exercise of reasonable
care toward him by the one in control and nlanagement of the locus."
The facts in the case at bar do not involve such a situation since there is no evidence that the door \Yhich plaintiff was seeking \vas in any \Yay similar to the door
through which he passed. l\Ioreover, the door which
plaintiff was seeking \\·as in the opposite end of defendant's premises at a place where it could not be readily
mistaken for the door through \vhich plaintiff entered.
Nor did plaintiff 1nake any reasonable effort to locate
the right door before passing through the \Yrong one.
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In the case of ill ont._qomery v. Allis-Chalmers ltfanufacturinlJ Co., (Tex.), 16± SW2d 556, the door through
"\Vhich plaintiff passed opened immediately from the display room onto a stair,vay. Thus, there was no opportunity for plaintiff to change her mind and correct her
1nistake after discovering her error. The basis for the
Court's decision is found in the following language:
"The doctrine we think applicable to the
situation presented, is announced in 38 Am. Jur.
(subject, N egl.), P'· 796, Sec. 135, as follows:
'It is well settled that where a store, office
building, or similar business establishment to
which the public is in1pliedly invited has a door
leading to a cellar, elevator shaft, or other dangerous place, which is left unfastened, and which,
from its location and appearance, may be mistaken for a door which a member of the public on
the premises is entitled to use, the proprietor is
liable to a person, who, by mistake, passes through
that door and is injured.'''
However, in the case at bar, the stairway down which
plaintiff fell was not immediately adjacent to the swinging door. On the contrary, he had to grope his way
through the darkness for a considerable distance before
he came to the stairway. When he opened the swinging
door and entered the dark room, that should have been
sufficient notice to him that he was on the wrong track.
However, he persisted, even after he should have discovered his error in following a pathway along which
there was not the slightest indication of an invitation
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to travel. The latter portion of the Am. Jur. statement
quoted in the Montgomery case applies here:

"* * * However, a recovery is denied the injured person if the situation 'vas such as to afford no reasonable ground for such a Inistake.
~Ioreover,a person who has received an injury
in consequence of passing through a wrong doorway in a part of the building not designed for the
use of unattended customers cannot recover unless he was induced to enter therein by the invitation or allurement of the keeper of the premises."
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK AS A MAITTER OF
LAW.

We here answer plaintiff's Point II.
A case quite similar on its facts to the case at bar is
Heidenreich v. Dumas, (N.H.), 190 A. 705. In that case
the plaintiff, a customer in defendant's restaurant \vhere
food and drink were dispensed, passed through a swinging door in the rear \vhich gave access to a kitchen. Fron1
the kitchen the only other door opened upon a flight of
stairs descending to the cellar. Plaintiff, desiring to go
to the toilet and assu1ning that it \Yas reached through the
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though there was at least one employee working in the
kitchen, plaintiff n1ade no inquiry for directions. He
went to a door which was unmarked, but which he assumed led to the toilet. Upon opening the door he found
darkness on the other side. Still without making inquiries as to a light or anything else, he stepped over the
threshold and fell down the stairs into the cellar. On
these ~~~ts the court held the plaintiff's motion for nonsuit should be granted and ordered judgment for the
defendant.
In the case of Thompson v. Beard and GablemanJ
Inc.J (Kan.), 216 Pac. 2d, 798, the court said:
"Suffice it to say that plaintiff was traveling
in a course she did not know; the door leading
from the private office was partially closed and
the light dim; on pushing the door inward she was
standing at the entrance of a basement stairway,
no bar or barrier about the steps, and was confronted with darkness which is always a signal
of danger. The darkness or dimness of light called
upon her to exercise greater caution for her own
safety than is ordinarily required and it was her
duty under such circumstances to refrain from
proceeding further wiJthout finding out where she
mi·ght safely goJ and by this failure to exercise
ordinary care for her safety, she was guilty of
neligence as a matter of law.JJ (Emphasis ours.)
Another similar case is Illinois Central Railway
Company v. S·andersonJ (Ky.), 192 S.W. 869. The court
there said:
"Passing the question whether the company
which had provided a suitable toilet for men and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
indicated its location by a proper sign, was bound
to anticipate that the entrance to the basement
might be mistaken by passengers as the entrance
to the toilet ... and whether the entrance in question was reasonably safe, it remains to determine
whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care for his
own safety. The mere fact that the door was there
and partly opened was not sufficient to justify
plaint~ff in assuming that the door led to the
toilet. In view of the necessity for doors for other
purposes, plaintiff should have anticipated that
the door in question might lead to a place other
than the toilet room. Plaintiff admits that he
did not look where he was going. He further says
that after he got through the door it was so dark
he could not see. Notwithstanding the fact, he
hurried through the door ... and fell down the
stairs. To bolt headlong i'nto a place that is unknown and so dark that one cannot see withottt_
stopping to determine U'hether it is safe to proceed is an act of recklessness about which reasonable minds could not well differ . . . . The trial
court should h.ave held as a matter of law, that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence,
and have directed a verdict in favor of defendant.'' (Emphasis ours.)
In Sartori v. Capitol City Lodge, (~finn.) ± N.\:v.
2d 339, the court held that a cornplaint 'vhich alleged that
plaintiff, while seeking a toilet in defendant's building,
entered a dark, unfamiliar passage,vay and fro1n it stepped into an open, totally dark basement doorw·ay thinking
it to be the toilet entrance and "Tas injured, showed affirmatively that the plaintiff \Yas guilty of contributory
negligence.
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In a recent California case, Wolfe v. Green Mears
Construction Company, 286 Pac. 2d 433, in holding plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
the court gave weight to the fact that plaintiff failed to
light matches which he had with him, while he was in
such darkness that he could not see his way. The court
quoted with approval from Robinson v. King, 113 ·Cal.
App. 2d 455, 457, 248 P. 2d 477, as follows:
"Where an invitee on premises, being unfamiliar therewith, proceeds into a place of inpenetrable darkness and falls into an aperture and
is injured, as a matter of law he does not exercise
ordinary care for his own safety and hence any
injury he receives is the result of his own contributory negligence for which he may not recover."
The court also quoted with approval from Mitchell v.
A. J. Bayer, Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 501, 504, 272 P. 2d
870, 872, as follows :
"We are also of the opinion that plaintiff was
shown to have been guilty of negligence as a
matter of law. He stepped into an area with which
he was unfamiliar; it was 'pitch dark' and he took
no precautions for his safety."
Another similar case where plaintiff was held guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, is Williams v. Treadway, (N.J.), 55 A. 2d 48.
We have found no Utah cases as closely similar on
their facts as those above cited and discussed. However,
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three recent decisions of this court are in full accord with
the principles upon which the foregoing decisions were
reached. In Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, (Utah), 259
P. 2d 297, this court held that the guest of a motel was
guilty of contributory negligence when he collided with a
chair while attempting to walk across his darkened room.
Said the Court :
"Dr. Morris appears to be confronted with
two horns of a dilemma, either (a) the room was
sufficiently lighted so that he could and should
by the exercise of ordinary, reasonable care and
observation for his own safety see the chair and
avoid walking into it, or (b) the room, or the
portion thereof in question, was so dark that he
could not see an object such as a chair, in \Yhich
event due care would have required him to turn on
a light."
In Tempest v. Richardson, (Utah), 299 P.2d 124,
plaintiff was a guest in defendant's home. While seeking
the bathroom, she opened a door and stepped inside and
fell down a stairway. In holding her guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of la\v, this court said:
"Had appellant exercised ordinary and reasonable care for her o\vn safety she \vould not
have opened a door and stepped into a dark and
unlighted area \vith \Yhich she \Yas unacquainted,
without first ascertaining \vhat \Vas beyond the
door even though she had not been told that the
roo1n to \vhich she was going was lighted."
The doctrine of that case \vas follo,ved in the later
case of Wood v. Wood, (Utah), 333 P.2d 630, \vhere this
court said:
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"In that regard she (plaintiff) is confronted
\\rith a dilennna; she either had in mind the existence of the stairwell, or she did not. If she did,
she was obligated to guard against the known
hazard; if she did not, she is met with the principle recently affirrned by this court in the case of
Tempest v. Richardson: that such a guest could
not enter heedlessly into the darkness in an unknown area and then compla~n of dangers there
encountered." (Emphasis ours.)
·Cases following the same line of reasoning are legion. The following are illustrative, but by no means
exhaustive, of the authorities:

I-Iudson v. Church of the Holy Trinity, (N.Y.),
166 NE 306;
Smith v. S~mon's Supply Co.,

(~iass.)

76 NE 2d

10;
Plahn v. Masonic Ilall Building Assn., (Minn.),
288 NW 575
Pease v. Nichols, (Ky.), 316 SW 2d 849;

Hart v. Sullivan., (Ill.), 58 NE 2d 301;
Solomon v. Fi·ner, (N.J.), 180 Atl. 567;
W esbrock v. Colby, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 494, 43 NE
2d 405;
Washburn v. Brunswick Hotel, 366 Pa. 463, 77 Atl.
2d 357;
Rhodes v. J. R. Watkins & Co., 16 Tenn. App. 163,
65 s.w. 2d 1098.
Knapp v. Conn. Theatrical Corp., 122 Conn. 413,
190 Atl. 291.
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The Utah case of JJ!f oore v. JJfiles, 158 P. 2d 676, i8
cited and relied upon by plaintiff. We believe that that
case is distinguishable from the case at bar, and from the
other Utah cases cited by us. In that case, plaintiff was
proceeding by a stairway which had been specifically provided by the defendant for the use of guests. There were
no bars or obstructions to indicate that passage was forbidden, nor were there any warning signs. Plaintiff was
following a path which she was invited to follow at the
time of the accident. We believe that the basis of the
court's decision is neatly summed up in the concurring
opinion of Justice Wolfe, which reads as follows:
"I concur. The stairway leading directly to
the parking lot was not barred. It was app.arently
for the use of the guests to make exit and entry to
and from the parking lot. It constituted an invitation to use it as such because it 'vas built for that
purpose and left open for use. Whether under its
improper state of lighting a prudent person
should have accepted the implied invitation is a
question for the jury 'vhose duty it is to judge
'vhether the plaintiff trying to go to the parking
lot in the most direct 'vay acted 'vith reasonable
prudence under the circumstances of the case."
(Emphasis ours.)
To the extent that More v. llf£les is not distinguishable from Morri·s v. Farnsworth llfotel, (lTtah), 259 P.
2d 297; Te1npest v. Ri.chardson, (lTtah), 299 P.2d 124,
and Wood v. Wood, (Utah), 333 P.2d 630, it has, by
necessary implication, been overruled by those later decisions.
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The case of JJfartin v. Fox West Coast Theatres
Corp., (Cal. App.), 108 P.2d 29, is also distinguishable.
As in llf oore v. Miles, the plaintiff was on a parking lot
where he had a right to be and had been invited to come.
He "ras entitled to expect that his host would have made
the way safe or provided warning of any danger to be
apprehended. Likewise, in the case of Flanigan v. Madison Plaza Grill, Inc., (N. ,J.), 30 A.2d 38, the plaintiff was
following a corridor which a sign indicated was the way
to the restroom. She entered a doorway adjacent to a
door indentified as leading to the men's restroom. Certainly this was a place where a ladies' rest room might be
expected to be located. As observed by the Court:
"The plaintiff's mistake was quite uderstandable considering the physical lay-out of the premises.''
So also, in Hall v. Boise Payette Lumber, (Ida.),
125 P. 2d 311, the plaintiff was following a course which
she had been directed to follow by the store manager.
Again she was entitled to expect that the place would be
made safe for her. There also the designated stairway
was immediately adjacent to the hallway which she had
been directed to enter. She did not proceed blindly
through a considerable area before she encountered
trouble.
The case of Stickle v. Unvon Pacific Ravlroad Co.,
(Utah), 251 P.2d 867, is wholly different on its facts.
We have no quarrel with the language of the court used
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In that case, and quoted by plaintiff, but it is wholly
inapplicable here. This is a case which is clear, and
where the question of contributory negligence is free
from doubt under principles repeatedly enunciated by
this court, and which, therefore, meets the test laid down
in the Stickle case, as one where the question of contributory negligence can be determined as a matter of law.
POINT IV
THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE ULTIMATE FA·CTS,
AND THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT TO
BE DETERMINED BY A JURY. THEREFORE THIS IS A
PROPER CASE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

We recognize that summary judgment is a drastic
remedy and one that should be granted only upon clear
showing that there are no contested issues as to any material facts. However, such a showing has been made
here. Plaintiff's own testimony establishes his own want
of care for his own safety. Under such circumstances,
there would be no benefit to the plaintiff to have a jury
trial which could only result in a directed verdict against
him, upon the basis of his own adn1issions as to his own
want of care for his own safety. 'Vhile a summary judgment is a drastic remedy, it is one 'vhich the court should
not hesitate to employ 'vhere 'varranted by the facts.
Certainly it was provided in our rules of procedure for
a definite purpose, na1nely to conserve the tin1e and energies of both the courts and the litigants in cases where
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solved as a 1natter of law. The basis and reasons for
the rule are well stated 1n G Moore's Fed. Prac. Sec.
56.04, p. 2028, as follows :
"The summary judgment procedure prescribed in Rule 56 is a p-rocedural device for
pro1nptly disposing of actions in which there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact. In many
cases there is no genuine issue of fact, although
such an issue is raised by the formal pleadings.
The purpose of Rule 56 is to eliminate a trial in
such cases, since a trial is unnecessary and results
in delay and expense which may operate to defeat
in whole or in part the recovery of a just claim
or the expeditious termination of an action because of a meritorious defense that is factually
indisputable. 'The very object of a motion for
summary judgment is to separate what is formal
or pretended in denial or averment from what is
genuine and substantial, so that only the latter
may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.'
"To attain this end, the rule permits a party
to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings
and to obtain relief by summary judgment where
facts set forth in detail in affidavits, deposition,
and admissions on file show there are no genuine
issues of material fact to be tried.

"* * * The court is authorized to examine
proffered materials extraneous to the pleadings,
not for the purpose of trying an issue, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried. If there is no such genuine
issue, the parties are not entitled to a trial, and
the court, applying the law to the undisputed material facts, may render a summary judgment.''
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CONCLUSION
The testimonies on depositions of the parties and
witnesses to the accident, show without dispute that
plaintiff entered upon a portion of defendant's premises
where he was not invited either expressly or by implication. Defendant therefore had no duty to anticipate
his presence or to make the way safe for him, and therefore was not guilty of any negligence if plaintiff encountered a dangerous condition in passing through portions of the premises to which he was not invited. There
is no showing that defendant had any reason to anticipate
the presence of patrons at the place where plaintiff was
injured. Plaintiff's own testimony shows that he groped
through -a darkened room where there was no illumination, and without availing himself of the means of light
which he had at his disposal. In so doing, he encountered
and failed to avoid a hazard which he could have readily
discovered if he had simply lighted his cigarette lighter.
Under the well established law as laid down by the decisions of this court, he is guilty of contributory negligence, and he voluntarily assumed the risk. He has no
cause of action against -the defendant and the judgment
below should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

1\IORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
By: RAY R. ·CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

